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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEE, District Judge. 
 
The United States appeals from an order of September 
10, 1998, suppressing a confession of appellee Vicki S. 
Leese ("Leese") to two postal inspectors from introduction 
into evidence by the prosecution in her forthcoming trial for 
misappropriation of postal funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1711. As the historic facts of the case are not in question, 
we exercise plenary review with respect to the district 
court's determination as to whether the police conduct 
found to have occurred constitutes custodial interrogation 
under all the circumstances of the case. United States v. 
Benton, 996 F.2d 642, 644 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1016, 114 S. Ct. 613, 126 L.Ed.2d 577 (1993).1 We find 
that the postal inspectors did not conduct a custodial 
interrogation or its functional equivalent. Thus, the order of 
September 10, 1998, will be reversed. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
The facts of the case, developed at the evidentiary hearing 
on Leese's motion to suppress, are largely undisputed. On 
February 17, 1998, Nick Alicea, a United States Postal 
Inspector, received a report indicating a discrepancy 
between the issuance of certain money orders and the 
remittance of the corresponding funds at the Manchester, 
Pennsylvania Post Office. The next day, February 18, 1998, 
Inspector Alicea went to the Manchester Post Office and 
investigated the discrepancies. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3731 and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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After reviewing certain financial records of the post office, 
Postal Inspector Alicea determined that between October 
28, 1997 and December 10, 1997, fourteen money order 
discrepancies existed, all of which were apparently 
attributable to Leese. Inspector Alicea then decided to 
interview Leese, who was on duty that day. Before notifying 
Leese of the desired interview, however, Inspector Alicea 
contacted another Postal Inspector, Jeffrey Fry, and 
requested that he come to the Post Office to assist in the 
interview of Leese. When Inspector Fry arrived, Inspector 
Alicea requested that the Postmaster, Dennis Hollinger 
("Postmaster"), inform Leese that Inspectors Alicea and Fry 
("Inspectors") wanted to speak with her in the Postmaster's 
private office. 
 
The Postmaster accompanied Leese to his office, then 
departed, closing the door as he exited. The Inspectors 
introduced themselves and told Leese they needed to ask 
her some questions. Both Inspectors wore plain clothes and 
Inspector Alicea wore a visible firearm.2 Inspector Alicea 
explained that Leese was not under arrest, that at the 
conclusion of the interview the Inspectors would be 
returning to Harrisburg, and that Leese would not be going 
with them. However, Inspector Alicea did not explicitly state 
that she was free to leave or stop answering questions at 
any time. 
 
Inspector Alicea proceeded to question Leese, while 
Inspector Fry took notes. Initially, the questions related to 
routine Post Office procedures; thereafter, Inspector Alicea 
began asking specific questions regarding the discovered 
discrepancies in Leese's accounts. Leese denied having any 
knowledge of discrepancies. 
 
Inspector Alicea then inquired of Leese as to whether she 
had any problems, i.e. financial, drug habit, that had 
caused her to "borrow" the money. At this point, Leese 
requested the questioning be stopped until she had an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. During the evidentiary hearing, there was conflicting testimony as to 
whether Inspector Alicea's firearm was visible. Leese testified that 
Inspector Alicea took off his jacket and she saw his holstered firearm. 
Both inspectors testified that Alicea's firearm was never visible. The 
District Court found that Inspector Alicea was wearing a visible firearm. 
 
                                3 
  
opportunity to speak with her union shop steward, Henry 
Dennis. The interview was temporarily halted until Mr. 
Dennis arrived, approximately an hour after the interview 
had been recessed.3 While awaiting Mr. Dennis' arrival, 
Leese accompanied Inspector Alicea on an audit of her 
accounts. 
 
Before the interview resumed, Leese met privately with 
Mr. Dennis.4 Inspector Alicea informed Leese that he was a 
friend of the prosecutor and that he would inform the 
prosecutor if Leese cooperated. Shortly thereafter, Leese 
requested to speak privately with Mr. Dennis again, at 
which time the Inspectors left the two alone in the 
Postmaster's office. After five to seven minutes, the 
Inspectors knocked on the office door, and Mr. Dennis 
requested that he and Leese be given additional time alone. 
The Inspectors responded by leaving the two alone for an 
additional three to five minutes. 
 
When the inspectors returned to the office, Leese 
confessed that she had taken between $500 and $1,000.5 
 
After hearing the testimony establishing these facts, the 
district court granted Leese's motion to suppress her 
confession finding: (i) Leese was summoned to the interview 
by her supervisor while she was on duty; (ii) the interview 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Both Leese and Fry testified during the evidentiary hearing that 
Inspector Alicea attempted to continue questioning Leese after she 
requested a union representative, but that Inspector Fry stopped him 
from asking any further questions. Both also testified that once Leese 
asked for the union shop steward's presence, she did not answer any 
further questions until the interview resumed with the union shop 
steward present. App. at 72, 84. 
 
4. Although it is undisputed that Leese and Mr. Dennis met privately, 
the record is unclear as to the location of the private discussion. The 
District Court, based on the evidentiary testimony of Alicia, App. at 37, 
and Leese, App. at 85, found that "[d]efendant conferred briefly with Mr. 
Dennis before they both went to into (sic) the Postmaster's office with 
the 
Inspectors." Mem. at 3. However, in its brief, appellant states that after 
Dennis arrived at the post office, "he entered the postmaster's office and 
spent approximately five to ten minutes alone wih defendant." 
Appellant's Br. at 8. 
 
5. The audit of Leese's accounts indicated a shortage of $1,995.66. 
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took place in the Postmaster's small, private office; (iii) prior 
to the interview, Leese was told that she was not under 
arrest; however, the Inspectors did not explicitly state that 
she was free to leave or free to refuse to answer their 
questions; (iv) during the interview, the Inspectors, 
particularly Inspector Alicea, who was wearing a visible 
firearm, employed an aggressive and intimidating tone and 
demeanor; (v) the Inspectors repeatedly accused Leese of 
taking the money; and (vi) lastly, Inspector Alicea told 
Leese, several times, that he was friends with the 
prosecutor and that if Leese cooperated he would let the 
prosecutor know. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
The denial of the suppression motion does not warrant 
elaborate consideration. Since Leese was not given Miranda 
warnings prior to the interview in question, the statements 
made by Leese are inadmissible as evidence if they were the 
product of "custodial interrogation."6 
 
Under controlling law, Miranda warnings are required 
only when a person has been deprived of his or her freedom 
in some significant way. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 
U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Steigler v. 
Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 1002, 95 S. Ct. 320, 42 L.Ed.2d 277 (1974). As this 
Court has noted, "custodial interrogation" is not susceptible 
of an exact definition; thus, the determination of whether 
statements are the product of such "custodial interrogation" 
must be made on a case-by-case basis. Steigler, 496 F.2d 
at 798; United States v. Clark, 425 F. 2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 820, 91 S. Ct. 38, 27 L.Ed.2d 48 (1970). 
 
In determining whether an individual is in custody, the 
ultimate inquiry is: "whether there is a `formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated 
with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because the parties agree that the inspectors' interview of Leese 
constituted an "interrogation" for Miranda purposes, our analysis is 
confined to the issue of whether Leese was in custody when the 
incriminating statements were made. 
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1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) 
(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 
711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam)); Steigler, 496 
F.2d at 798 (the objective test is whether the government 
has in some meaningful way imposed restraint on a 
person's freedom of action). Where, as here, the individual 
has not been openly arrested when the statements are 
made, "something must be said or done by the authorities, 
either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent 
of their questioning, which indicates they would not have 
heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do 
so." Steigler, 496 F.2d at 799 (quoting United States v. Hall, 
421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied , 397 U.S. 
990, 90 S. Ct. 1123, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970)); accord 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 492. It is also established beyond 
doubt that a custodial interrogation may occur outside the 
police station. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S. Ct. 
1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969). 
 
In making our determination, we are mindful of the 
Supreme Court's caution that "custody" must not be read 
too broadly: "[P]olice officers are not required to administer 
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is 
the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because 
. . . the questioned person is one whom the police suspect." 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S. Ct. at 714; accord 
Steigler, 496 F.2d at 799. However, "[t]he more cause for 
believing the suspect committed the crime, the greater the 
tendency to bear down in interrogation and to create the 
kind of atmosphere of significant restraint that triggers 
Miranda . . . But this is simply one circumstance, to be 
weighed with all the others." Steigler, 496 F.2d at 799-800 
(quoting Hall, 421 F.2d at 545). 
 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is 
clear that Leese was not in custody at the time she gave her 
statement in the Postmaster's office. Not only was Leese 
told that she was not under arrest before the questioning 
began, but she was specifically informed that when the 
questioning was concluded the inspectors would be 
returning to Harrisburg and she would not be going with 
them. 
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Moreover, each time either Leese or her union shop 
steward made a request of the inspectors, the request was 
honored. First, Leese requested the questioning be stopped 
until she had an opportunity to speak with her union shop 
steward. The inspectors honored her request, stopping the 
interview until the union shop steward arrived at the post 
office. The interview did not resume until after Leese had 
been given an opportunity to consult privately with the 
union shop steward. 
 
When Leese requested the questioning be stopped a 
second time, in order for her to consult privately with the 
union shop steward, her request was again honored by the 
inspectors. After five to ten minutes, the inspectors 
knocked on the door, and when the shop steward requested 
that he and Leese be given additional time alone, the 
inspectors complied, leaving them alone for an additional 
three to five minutes. 
 
The record presented to us is one of postal inspectors 
conscientiously interviewing a woman, who was under 
considerable suspicion. A significant portion of the 
questioning was in the typical police interrogation mode, 
confirming Leese's knowledge of Post Office procedures, 
confronting her with the found discrepancies in her 
accounts, asking her point blank as to whether she 
committed the crime, challenging her answers, and 
attempting to discover the details of the crime. There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the inspectors would 
not have departed on request or allowed Leese to do so. 
Once this point is passed, little remains. 
 
It should be noted that the record does not show that 
Leese's will was overcome by coercive tactics of the postal 
inspectors. For instance, Leese admitted only to"borrowing" 
$500 to $1,000, when in fact the audit of her accounts 
disclosed a shortage of $1,995.66. Appellant's Br. at 8. 
Furthermore, although the inspectors requested Leese to 
provide a written statement, she refused. Cf. Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 
(1978) (police repeatedly questioned defendant while in 
intensive care unit of hospital, encumbered with tubes, 
needles and breathing apparatus); Davis v. North Carolina, 
384 U.S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966) 
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(defendant's will was overborne by police authorities who 
repeatedly interrogated defendant over a period of 16 days); 
and Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S. Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 
948 (1961) (police deprived defendant of food and sleep.) 
 
Based on our review of the record and being bound by 
United States Supreme Court precedent, particularly 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493-94, 97 S. Ct. 713-14, and INS 
v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-20, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763- 
65 (1984), it is our conclusion that, although this is a close 
case, the manner in which the Inspectors conducted their 
interview did not rise to a situation where Leese was either 
in custody or being significantly deprived of her liberty. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 
(1977) (defendant found not to be "in custody" 
notwithstanding fact that police officer falsely stated that 
defendant's fingerprints were found at the scene of the 
crime); Beckwith, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 
1 (1976) ("in custody" requirement not satisfied merely 
because defendant was the focus of the investigation when 
interviewed). But see Orozco, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S. Ct. 1095, 
22 L.Ed.2d 311 (defendant found to be "in custody" when 
questioned in his bedroom at 4:00 a.m. by four police 
officers). 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the above reasons, we will reverse the September 10, 
1998 order of the district court suppressing the confession 
of Vicki S. Leese. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                8 
 
